PAOLO RECH

Radiation Reliability Issues in Current and Future Supercomputers





Sponsors

EnergySFE

Energy-aware Scheduling and Fault Tolerance Techniques for the Exascale Era STIC-AmSud Project





HPC reliability importance



Feature | Computing | Hardware

How To Kill A Supercomputer: Dirty Power, Cosmic Rays, and Bad Solder

Will future exascale supercomputers be able to withstand the steady onslaught of routine faults?

By Al Geist Posted 23 Feb 2016 | 16:00 GMT



As a child, were you ever afraid that a monster lurking in your bedroom would leap out of the dark and get you? My job at <u>Oak Ridge National</u>



Available Accelerators

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- Low cost
- Flexible platform
- High efficiency (low per-thread consumption)
- High computational power and frequency
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Error Rate

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Titan



High probability of having a GPU corrupted Titan Detected Uncorrectable Errors MTBF is ~44h* *(field and experimental data from HPCA'15)





HPC bad stories

Virginia Tech's Advanced Computing facility built a supercomputer called Big Mac in 2003

- 1,100 Apple Power Mac G5
- Couldn't boot because of the failure rate



- Power Mac G5 did not have error-correcting code (ECC) memory
- Big Mac was broken apart and sold on-line

Jaguar – (2009 #1 Top500 list) • 360 terabytes of main memory • 350 ECC errors per minute

ASCI Q - (2002 #2 in Top500 list)

- Built with AlphaServers
- 7 Teraflops
- Couldn't run more than 1h without crash
- After putting metal side it could last 6h before crash

 Address bus on the microprocessors were unprotected (causing the crashes)

Outline

The origins of the issue:

- Radiation Effects Essentials
- Error Criticality in HPC

Understand the issue:

- Experimental Procedure
- K40 vs Xeon Phi

Toward the solution of the issue:

- ECC ABFT Duplication
- Selective Hardening

What's the Plan?

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Terrestrial Radiation Environment

Cosmic rays could be so energetic to pass the Van Allen belts



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Galactic cosmic rays interact with atmosphere shower of energetic particles: Muons, Pions, Protons, Gamma rays, Neutrons

13 n/(cm²·h) @sea level*

Altitude and Radiation



Maximum ionization @ ~13KM above sea level

Altitude and Radiation



Maximum ionization @ ~13KM above sea level

Radiation Effects - Soft Errors

Soft Errors: the device is not permanently damaged, but the particle may generate:

One or more bit-flips
Single Event Upset (SEU)
Multiple Bit Upset (MBU)

Transient voltage pulse
Single Event Transient (SET)
Logic

IONIZING

PARTICLE

FF

Silent Data Corruption vs Crash

Soft Errors in: -data cache -register files -logic gates (ALU) -scheduler

Silent Data Corruption

Soft Errors in: -instruction cache -scheduler / dispatcher -PCI-e bus controller

DUE (Crash)

Radiation Effects on Parallel Accelerators



Nr

core

core

Output Correctness in HPC



A single fault can propagate to several parallel threads: multiple corrupted elements.

Output Correctness in HPC



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Not all SDCs are critical for HPC applications

error can be in the float intrinsic variance





Values in a given range are accepted as correct in physical simulations

Imprecise computation is being applied to HPC

Output Correctness in HPC



A single fault can propagate to several parallel threads: multiple corrupted elements.

Not all SDCs are critical for HPC applications

Goal: quantify and qualify SDC in **NVIDIA** and **Intel** architectures.



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Radiation Test Facilities

Irradiation of Chips Electronics

Experimental Setup



Radiation Test are NOT for dummies



CANSCE GPU Radiation Test Setup





LANSCE • GPU Radiation Test Setup



Neutrons Spectrum



@LANSCE 1.8x10⁶ n/(cm² h) @NYC 13 n/(cm² h)

We test each architecture for 800h, simulating 9.2x10⁸ h of natural radiation (~ 91,000 years)

Neutrons Spectrum



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We test each architecture for 800h, simulating 9.2x10⁸ h of natural radiation (~ 91,000 years)

All the collected SDCs are publicly available: https://github.com/UFRGS-CAROL/HPCA2017-log-data

Selected Algorithms

We select a set of benchmarks that:

- stimulate different resources
- are representative of HPC applications
- minimize error masking (high AVF)
- **DGEMM:** matrix multiplication
- lavaMD: particles interactions
- Hotspot: heat simulation
- Needleman–Wunsch: Biology
- CLAMR: DOE's workload
- Quick- Merge- Radix-Sort
- Matrix Transpose: Memory
- Gaussian



Xeon Phi vs K40 SDC rate

Xeon Phi error rate seems lower than Kepler, but:

-Xeon Phi is built in 3D Trigate, Kepler in planar CMOS -Xeon Phi and K40 have different throughput



Parallelism Management Reliability

~95% processor resources used with smallest input

Increasing the input size we increase the #threads: -Xeon-Phi error rate remains constant (<20% variation) -K40 SDC error rate increases with input size



Parallelism Management Reliability

K40



FIT increases with input size: **HW scheduler is prone to be corrupted!**

data of 2048 active threads is maintained in the register file Xeon-Phi



constant FIT rate: embedded OS is OK!

only 4 threads/core are maintained. Other threads data in the main memory (not exposed)

Parallelism Management Reliability

K40 throughput increases with input size. **Reliability vs Performances** trade-off should be considered



Mean Workload Between Failures



Mean Workload Between Failures



Mean Workload Between Failures



Which architecture produces a higher amount of data before experiencing a failure? Is there a sweet spot?

Mean Workload Between Failures
DGEMM MWBF

Xeon-Phi MWBF decreases significantly with input size. Even if more prone to be corrupted, Kepler produces more correct data (if parallelism is exploited)



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Quantify and Qualify SDCs



Quantify and Qualify SDCs









BAD: high number of corrupted elements, which are very different from the expected output



K40 few corrupted elements, value similar to expected one



Both K40 and Xeon Phi have few corrupted elements. K40 corruption are very different from the expected one DGEMM lavaMD Xeon Phi K40 ≥ 20000-Average Relative Error (%) 15000 Average Relative Error (%) 10000-3000 4000 ≥ 5000 2000 1000 Number of Incorrect Elements Number of Incorrect Elements

Purely arithmetic operations are more reliable (and faster) on the K40 (GPUs have shorten and faster pipelines).

Xeon Phi is more reliable for Finite Different Methods (lavaMD), which are based on transcendental functions (exp).



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ECC ON - SDC

ECC reduces the **SDC FIT** of ~1 order of magnitude (there is almost no code dependence)



ECC ON - Crash



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ECC ON – SDC vs Crashes

When the ECC is ON **Crashes** are more likely to occur than **SDCs (this is GOOD for HPC centers!)**



Algorithm Based Fault Tolerance

ABFT: technique designed specifically for an algorithm. ABFT requires: **input coding**, **algorithm modification**, and **output decoding** with error detection/correction

> Huang and Abraham '84 Rech et al., TNS '13



FFT Hardening Idea*



ECC vs ABFT



Duplication With Comparison



Spatial: block i and i+N are duplicated

E-O Spatial: block i and i+1 are duplicated

Time: a thread executes twice the operations

Hotspot - DWC results*

Spatial DWC detects all SDC Spatial E-O detects 80% of SDC Time DWC detects 90% of SDC 1000 1

Only Time DWC reduces Crashes (no additional Blocks scheduling required)

DWC is promising: it is generic, easily implemented, and effective...

BUT execution time overhead for **Spatial DWC** and **Spatial E-O** is 2.5x and for **Time DWC is 2x** (data is not copied)



What's next? Selective Hardening!

Duplicate only what REALLY matters

SDC causes a

huge error

analyze SDC criticality: are there "acceptable" SDCs?

example: CLAMR (DOE workload) experimental result

SDC causes a single pixel error











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What's next? Selective Hardening!

Duplicate only what REALLY matters

- 1. analyze SDC criticality: are there "acceptable" SDCs?
- 2. detect SW-HW causes for critical SDCs -code analysis -fault-injection (NVIDIA SASSIFI and UFRGS CAROL-FI)

What's next? Selective Hardening!

Duplicate only what REALLY matters

- 1. analyze SDC criticality: are there "acceptable" SDCs?
- 2. detect SW-HW causes for critical SDCs -code analysis -fault-injection (NVIDIA SASSIFI and UFRGS CAROL-FI)
- 3. harden selected portions of the code
- 4. evaluate enhanced reliability and performances

SASSI-FI and CAROL-FI



Architecture-level Propagation Analysis (APA)

> Appl Failu

Implementation-level Propagation Analysis (IPA)



Application Failure Rate

SASSI-FI: NVIDIA architectural-level fault-injector

SASSI-FI and CAROL-FI





Failure Rate

Implementation-level Propagation Analysis (IPA)

Architecture-level

(APA)

SASSI-FI: NVIDIA architectural-level fault-injector

CAROL-FI: UFRGS high-Level Fault Injector for Xeon-Phi and any X86-base processor

Modify content of memory currently allocated.

Fault Injector requirements:

- -GDB with python support
- -OS Interruption signals

-Compile the source code in debug mode



CAROL-FI



Radiation Data vs CAROL-FI

Radiation and FI give very different information.



CAROL-FI Results

We have injected more than 67,000 faults



Results - DGEMM



Results - CLAMR


Results - Hotspot



Results - LavaMD



Results - LUD



Results - NW



Results

CAROL-FI insights:

- Selective hardening will be effective for DGEMM and Hotspot (small portion of memory causes harm)
- Selective hardening may not be effective for LavaMD and NW (big portion of memory causes harm)
- CLAMR: specific operations should be hardened (Sort and K-D Tree)

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Propose selective-hardening solutions
(duplicate only what matters, what REALLY matters)

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